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Abstract 20 
The prevalence of water quality incidents and disease outbreaks suggests an imperative to 21 
analyse and understand the roles of operators and organisations in the water supply system.  22 
One means considered in this paper is through human reliability analysis (HRA).  We 23 
classify the human errors contributing to 62 drinking water accidents occurring in affluent 24 
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countries from 1974 to 2001; define the lifecycle of these incidents; and adapt Reason’s 25 
‘Swiss cheese’ model for drinking water safety.  We discuss the role of HRA in human 26 
error reduction and drinking water safety and propose a future research agenda for human 27 
error reduction in the water sector. 28 
 29 
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1. Introduction 33 
Preventative risk management has re-emerged as a central tenet of drinking water 34 
provision following the active promotion of the multibarrier approach (see Havelaar, 1994), 35 
publication of the revised World Health Organisation (WHO) drinking water guidelines 36 
(WHO, 2006) and various investigations of disease outbreaks (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004; 37 
Smeets et al. 2008).  Risk analysis tools may provide valuable support to process design 38 
and optimisation (Pollard et al. 2004), but in isolation, and without being embedded an 39 
organisational culture of risk management, are limited in their ability to prevent incidents 40 
(Choudhrya et al. 2007).  The authors of this paper have a long standing research interest in 41 
implementing preventative risk management among water suppliers, and in the role that 42 
recent initiatives play in raising the profile of preventative risk management (AWWA et al. 43 
2001).  Our studies have progressed beyond an inventory of risk analysis tools in the water 44 
utility sector (MacGillivray et al. 2007a; 2007b), through an analysis of water quality 45 
incidents (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) and the benchmarking of water supplier competencies 46 
(MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008), to an exploration of the organisational relationships 47 
within water suppliers, and between suppliers and health agencies (Pollard et al., 2009).  48 
Human actions and factors play an important role in water quality incidents (Pollard, 2008) 49 
3 
to an extent that we believe a formal analysis of human reliability would be beneficial in 50 
preventing disease outbreaks.  Here, we present a secondary analysis of Hrudey and 51 
Hrudey’s (2004) case studies in water disease outbreaks, and adopt Reason’s (1990) ‘Swiss 52 
cheese’ model of organisational incidents in re-categorising the causal factors that influence 53 
disease outbreaks.  Reason’s model has wide application within the water sector and 54 
obvious parallels with the multi-barrier approach that includes several layers of defence to 55 
prevent water from contaminantion (Havelaar, 1994).  Such defences include source water 56 
assessment and protection, the identification and correction of system defects, proper 57 
maintenance of the well and distribution system, the appropriate use of disinfection where 58 
necessary, and monitoring.  We are interested in how we might extend Reason’s analogy to 59 
improve human reliability in water supply operations, with the assistance of HRA (Kirwan, 60 
1996; Kirwan et al. 1997; Kirwan, 1997). 61 
Research attention in the reliability and maintenance community has conventionally 62 
been centred on physical and software systems.  Industrial accidents were historically 63 
characterised in terms of technological malfunctions, and the human element in the cause of 64 
the accident tended to be overlooked (Gordon, 1998).  A new subject, HRA, has attracted 65 
researchers’ attention since the 1980s, especially since the post-mortem analyses of fatal 66 
accidents often highlights the critical role played by human error.  It is suggested that the 67 
cause of about 80% of all accidents can be attributed to human error (Whittingham, 2003).  68 
The term ‘human reliability’ is usually defined as the probability that a person will 69 
correctly perform some system-required activity during a given time period, without 70 
performing any extraneous activity that might degrade the system.  HRA arose from the 71 
need to describe incorrect human actions in the context of probabilistic risk assessment 72 
(PRA) or probabilistic safety analyses (PSA) Hollnagel, 2000). 73 
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As with all risk analysis techniques, advocates and adversaries have emerged for HRA.  74 
However, a number of sectors (e.g. nuclear, transport, offshore oil and gas) have 75 
enthusiastically embraced HRA as one means of addressing their human factor and safety 76 
problems.  Alternatively, these sectors have been required to apply them through public or 77 
government pressure.  The nuclear industry was the first to develop and apply HRA 78 
(Kirwan, 1994), in part driven by public and regulatory fears of nuclear accidents and by 79 
the risks incurred by investing operational responsibility in the hands of a single control 80 
room operator.  Other industries including aviation and aerospace, rail, air traffic control, 81 
automobile, offshore oil and gas, chemical, and all parts of the military have also applied 82 
HRA (Kletz, 1994; Lyons, et al. 2004).  A comprehensive review of the distribution of the 83 
HRA literature (1981-2003) is provided by Dhillon and Liu (2006), together with a 84 
distribution of applied research in various sectors (Figure 1).  Their analysis offers little 85 
information on the application of HRA to drinking water safety.  How then might HRA 86 
help the sector? 87 
 88 
<<Figure 1: Publication distribution of HRA by industrial sector (adapted from Dhillon and Liu, 89 
2006)>> 90 
 91 
Hrudey & Hrudey (2004) studies cases of disease outbreaks in 15 affluent nations over 92 
the past 30 years, which provides a detailed retrospective analysis of those water incidents. 93 
Below, we reappraise 62 cases of drinking water accidents (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004), and 94 
classify human errors that directly or indirectly cause these accidents, analysing the 95 
development process of accidents.  We argue that the Reason Swiss cheese model requires 96 
modification for drinking water safety, and we offer a revised model. 97 
 98 
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2 Error and human reliability analysis 99 
HRA applies relevant information about human characteristics and behaviour to the 100 
design of objects, facilities, processes and environments that people use (Grandjean, 1980).  101 
HRA techniques may be used retrospectively, in the analysis of incidents (though this 102 
occurs infrequently), or prospectively to examine a system and its vulnerabilities during the 103 
design phase.  Most approaches are grounded in a systemic approach, which sees the 104 
human contribution in the context of the wider technical and organisational context 105 
(Embrey, 2000).  The purpose of HRA is to examine any human-involved systems or 106 
processes where weaknesses may lie or create a vulnerability to errors, rather than to find 107 
faults or apportion blame. 108 
2.1 Error classification 109 
Error classification describes the types of errors that humans make.  A number of 110 
taxonomies exist (Meister, 1971; Swain and Guttman, 1983; Reason 1990).  The most 111 
commonly used system, proposed by Reason (1990), is to classify human errors into slips, 112 
lapses, mistakes, and violations.  Two theoretical perspectives on human error in complex, 113 
sociotechnical systems are the ‘person’ approach and the ‘systems’ perspective.  Person 114 
approach (Reason, 2000) errors arise from aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, 115 
inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness.  Here, human error 116 
is treated as the cause of most accidents, and the systems in which people work are 117 
assumed to be safe.  The systems perspective (Reason, 2000) treats error as a systems rather 118 
than an individual’s failure, and considers the combined role of latent conditions (e.g. 119 
inadequate equipment, poor design, inadequate supervision, manufacturing defects, 120 
maintenance failures, inadequate training, clumsy automation, inappropriate or ill-defined 121 
procedures) and human errors (also known as active errors or failures) in accident causation 122 
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and propagation.  Human error is no longer treated as the primary cause of accidents; rather 123 
as a consequence of latent conditions residing within the system. 124 
Reason (1990) describes four levels of human failure, each influencing the next 125 
(Figure 2).  In his Swiss cheese model, Reason hypothesises that most accidents can be 126 
traced to one or more of four levels of failure: organizational influences, unsafe 127 
supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and the unsafe acts themselves.  An 128 
organization's defences against failure are modelled as a series of barriers, represented as 129 
the slices of a Swiss cheese.  The ‘holes’ in the cheese slices represent individual 130 
weaknesses in individual parts of the system, and are dynamically varying in size and 131 
position across all slices.  Unsafe acts can be seen as active failures, whereas the remaining 132 
three slices in Figure 2 are latent failures.  The main distinction between active and latent 133 
failures lies in: 134 
• Active errors.  The consequences of active errors may become apparent within a 135 
very short time; such errors can be an omission or using the wrong rule.  They are 136 
most likely to be caused by front-line operators; 137 
• Latent errors.  The consequences of latent errors may only become apparent after a 138 
period of time, or when combined with other errors, or particular operational 139 
conditions. 140 
 141 
Figure 2 The Swiss cheese model (redrawn from Reason 1990) 142 
 143 
 144 
A brief description of each of the levels and their associated taxonomies is given below. 145 
• Unsafe acts are largely due to operators.  These are caused by an operator’s lack of 146 
knowledge or poor choices; for example, in an incorrect response to an emergency, 147 
or poor decision, etc; 148 
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• Preconditions for unsafe acts exist because of adverse mental states that affect 149 
performance; for example, loss of situational awareness, and inattention or 150 
distraction, or a failure to communicate or coordinate. 151 
• Unsafe supervision occurs through inadequate guidance or oversight, or a failure to 152 
provide adequate training. 153 
• Organisational influences such as process or managerial errors result from 154 
inadequate or misinterpreted corporate decisions, for example, a failure to provide 155 
adequate guidance or inadequate documentation, or the attitudes and behaviours of 156 
employees and contractors etc.  157 
2.2 Error reduction and management 158 
Error management programmes use formal methods to develop a deeper understanding 159 
of the nature of, and factors surrounding, error in a particular system.  The goal of error 160 
management is the eradication, reduction, management and mitigation of errors and their 161 
consequences.  Reason again (1997) cites a wide range of error management techniques, 162 
including selection, training, licensing and certification and skill checks.  The techniques of 163 
human error prediction are particularly useful.  A typical HRA modelling process includes 164 
three stages: (1) the identification of human errors, (2) the prediction of their likelihood, 165 
and (3) the reduction of their likelihood, if required. 166 
HRA techniques are commonly categorized into two generations.  The first-generation 167 
were developed for the probabilistic safety assessment of plant risk whereas the second 168 
generation applied cognition analysis.  First generation tools include the tools THERP 169 
(Swain and Guttmann, 1983), HEART (Williams, 1986), SLIM (Embrey, 1984), ASEP 170 
(Swain 1987), TESEO (Bello and Colombari, 1980) and HCR (Hannaman, 1984).  The 171 
second generation tools include ATHEANA (Cooper et.al. 1996), CREAM (Hollnagel, 172 
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1998), or MERMOS (Bieder, 1998).  By illustration, in the HEART methodology, the 173 
failure rate is estimated using an empirical expression of the form: 174 
    
( )
( )


































            (1) 175 
where HEP is the human error probability, HEPb  is the nominal human error probability , λ 176 
is the overall human error rate , λb  is nominal human error rate, EPCi is the ith error 177 
promoting condition and Api is a proportion assessment factor for the ith EPC.  Here, the 178 
error promoting condition can be unfamiliarity, time shortage, noisy or confused 179 
signals/communications, poor man machine interface, misperception of risk, poor feedback, 180 
inexperience, poor instructions, etc.  For example, a given task has the proposed nominal 181 
human unreliability value of 0.002, and the factors shown in Table 1. 182 
Table 1: Estimating human error probability. 183 
The final calculation for the human error probability can therefore be given by: 184 
 185 
HEP=0.002 × 1.5 × 3.4 × 2.2 × 1.25 × 1.4 = 0.04 186 
 187 
3 Applying HRA in the water utility sector 188 
From a physical asset perspective, a drinking water distribution system is an 189 
interconnected collection of sources, pipes, and hydraulic control elements (pumps, valves, 190 
regulators, and tanks), delivering safe drinking water to consumers in prescribed quantities 191 
and at desired pressures.  It can be composed of water sources, raw water transmission 192 
pipes, unit water treatment processes combined together in treatment plants, and water 193 
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distribution networks.  Unlike conventional HRA applications that involve smaller, highly 194 
contained systems (e.g. nuclear plants, aeroplanes), water distribution systems are widely 195 
distributed.  To illustrate application of Reason’s model, we select 62 drinking water 196 
incidents from Hrudey and Hrudey (2004) and categorise the human errors in these cases 197 
(Table 7).  A distribution of the main errors is shown in Table 2 and Figure 3, suggesting 198 
that 38% of direct and/or indirect causes can be due to active errors, 36% in the class of 199 
latent errors and 3% attributed to consumers and/or regulators.  Table 3 lists some failures 200 
due to physical or environmental problems.  Our definitions are presented in Tables 4-6.  201 
One may argue that the errors in Table 4 can be classified as latent and attributable to 202 
multiple actors.  From Table 2, we note that among the 65 active errors, 16 are attributable 203 
to a “mistaken belief in the security of a water system”, 11 are attributable to a failure “to 204 
recognise warnings” and 19 to a failure “to take adequate measures on warning”.  All of 205 
the three types of errors can traced to organisation structures. 206 
 207 
Table 2. Human error distribution in the 62 cases. 208 
 209 
Figure 3 Human error distribution. 210 
 211 
The literature review indicates that, in comparison to other domains in which HRA has 212 
been identified as a major problem, the construct has received relatively little attention 213 
within the water sector.  This is surprising given the apparently significant role of human 214 
error reported by Hrudey and Hrudey (2004; Table 2).  Latent errors contribute 215 
significantly to the human errors in the 62 cases (Table 2) suggesting organisational 216 
reliability is a critical factor contributing to drinking water incidents. 217 
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3.1 The gestation of drinking water incidents  218 
Unlike accidents in other industries, many drinking water incidents last for extended 219 
periods from the initial period of contamination to the restoration of safe drinking water 220 
quality.  The immediate outbreaks in Milwaukee (case 38; Table 7) and in Walkerton (case 221 
57; Table 7), lasted more than one month with subsequent consequences lasting for many 222 
months and years thereafter.  Another example of the extended duration of drinking water 223 
incidents is the accidental contamination of drinking water supplies in north Cornwall that 224 
occurred in July 1988, the long term health impacts of which has been reviewed on a 225 
number of occasions, most recently in 2005 (DoH, 2005).  Whilst there is no opportunity 226 
for recall once drinking water has been supplied, responsive action by water suppliers and 227 
health agencies may still reduce impacts on consumers.  The gestation of a typical drinking 228 
water incident might be represented by Figure 4. 229 
1) Contamination phase.  This period is the time starting from the occurrence of a 230 
triggering cause capable of contaminating the drinking water until the time that the 231 
drinking water is actually contaminated.  The contaminating period can be hard to 232 
estimate exactly.  The cause can be due to extreme weather (e.g. the heavy rainfall in 233 
case 57), or unsafe maintenance work (e.g. a sewerage system maintenance exposing 234 
water distribution to risk in case 30), or wastes from infected wildlife (e.g. infected 235 
beavers in case 7).  Numerous human errors may occur in this period, such as 236 
maintenance errors (e.g. case 30), design errors (e.g. case 57), unsafe acts (e.g. case 237 
16). 238 
2) Sensing phase.  Abnormalities associated with the contaminated water can be sensed 239 
by either consumers or quality monitoring systems.  Human errors that might occur 240 
include: failure to perform routine monitoring (e.g. case 17, 57); design errors in the 241 
monitoring system (e.g. case 23); failure to interpret monitoring results correctly (e.g. 242 
case 59); failure to respond to consumer complaints (e.g. case 38).  243 
3) Alarm phase.  This is the time between abnormalities being sensed and warning(s) 244 
being signalled.  After consumers or monitoring systems have sensed any 245 
abnormalities about water, alarms should be raised to engender a response.  A 246 
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common human error in this period is that no warning signals are raised or warnings 247 
are inadequate. For example, infected consumers were not recognized to signal 248 
warnings (e.g. case 43) or did not signal warnings in a timely manner (e.g. case 59).  249 
4) Recognition period.  Although warnings about abnormalities have been signalled, 250 
they have ignored or not been paid enough attention. Human errors in this period can 251 
be: failure to respond to warnings (e.g. cases 2, 13, 20, 22, 35, 37, 54, 57, 61), 252 
inadequate response to warnings (e.g. cases 9, 10), etc.  It should be noticed that 253 
raising warnings or issuing a boil water advisory might be a difficult measure for a 254 
water company to take on its own but such decisions should ideally be coordinated 255 
with public health authorities.  Frequent warnings or issuing boil water advisories can 256 
damage a company’s reputation, but failure to provide warnings when they are 257 
required will certainly attract liability. 258 
5) Investigation and recovery phase.  The previous four phases might not all exist for 259 
accidents occurring in other industries, for example, the crash of an aeroplane or the 260 
explosion of a chemical plant.  However, common to all accidents is the need for an 261 
investigation and recovery period after an accident occurs.  In both literature and post-262 
mortem analysis reports, no discussion on human error occurring in this period has 263 
been found. However, an obvious human error that is likely to be all too common 264 
would be denial, leading to an inadequate investigation. 265 
 266 
It should be noted that drinking water incidents do not necessarily go through all of the 267 
above periods. They may have only some of the periods as shown in Figure 4. 268 
 269 
Figure 4 A typical gestation for a drinking water incident. 270 
3.2 A modified Swiss cheese model  271 
The Reason Swiss cheese model has two limitations restricting its application, 272 
unmodified, to drinking water accidents.  Firstly, an accident is defined as a one-off event 273 
lasting for a very short time, which is the case for aeroplane crashes, or explosions at 274 
chemical plant.  However, drinking water incidents are seldom one-off events; they usually 275 
develop with time and often last for several days.  The gestation (or lifecycle) of a typical 276 
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drinking water incident is presented in Figure 4.  Secondly, the organisational boundary for 277 
drinking water incidents extends well beyond the corporate structure to include other 278 
stakeholders.  From the 61 case studies, we notice that water consumers and regulators can 279 
play important roles in preventing more serious outcomes during these events.  Their 280 
involvement can be to sense abnormalities, to report abnormalities, and to comply with 281 
measures their drinking water supplier has taken: 282 
• To sense abnormalities.  This is often the first critical step in drinking water 283 
incidents.  For example, in case 34, a consumer had sensed a foul smell but didn’t 284 
report the abnormality, this also happened in case 54. 285 
• To report abnormalities.  Early warning signals are critical.  Since a drinking water 286 
system is commonly a widely distributed system, it can be hard for the water 287 
supplier to sense every abnormality the whole time.  It is vitally important that 288 
consumers report any abnormalities about their drinking water and systems to their 289 
supplier.  Hrudey and Hrudey (2004) comment: 290 
The observation that the earliest signs of this outbreak were signalled by consumer 291 
complaints about excess turbidity provides an important message to drinking water 292 
providers about the attention that should be paid to consumer complaints about 293 
water quality (page 177, Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) 294 
This case study provides another example where consumers noticed the water was 295 
“off”.  This observation might have provided an opportunity for earlier intervention 296 
if the first mention of a consumer noticing something wrong had been reported and 297 
acted upon (page 220, Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004).   298 
For example, in case 38, it is the drinking water supplier who failed to recognize 299 
warning signals from consumer complaints. 300 
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To comply with measures their drinking water company has taken.  During disease 301 
outbreaks compliance with boil water notices (advisories) can be vital to preventing 302 
propagation of disease.  Notwithstanding observations that compliance is far from 303 
universal and reduces with time (O'Donnell, Platt and Alston, 2000; Willcocks et al, 304 
2000; Karagianmis, Schimmer and de Rouda Husman, 2008), effective 305 
collaboration with water consumers is critical (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004): 306 
This finding raises concern about the level of understanding that may exist in a 307 
community during the boil water advisory and raises the need for an explanatory 308 
literature to be provided to any population at risk immediately after a boil water 309 
advisory is issued (page 287, Hrudey and Hrudey 2004). 310 
Equally, regulators play an important role in preventing drinking water accidents.  For 311 
example, in case 7, one of the causes was that regulators failed to appreciate the 312 
vulnerability of surface water, and in case 57, regulators failed to implement policy 313 
requiring continuous chlorine residual monitors on vulnerable shallow wells.  Viewing 314 
Table 7, the main contributions of error involved the following: 315 
• customers sensed abnormalities, but failed to report to their water supplier; 316 
• customers sensed abnormalities, reported to their water suppliers, but the supplier 317 
then failed to respond to the reports; 318 
• customer sensed abnormalities and reported to their water suppliers which 319 
responded to the reports, and accidents were successfully prevented.  These may 320 
have happened in many cases but have not been reported. 321 
The Swiss cheese model does not consider the role of third parties beyond the scope of 322 
an individual company or organisation.  From this analysis however, it is suggested that 323 
third parties (regulators and the drinking water consumers), be considered in the HRA of 324 
drinking water incidents.  We therefore propose another ‘slice’ of cheese to represent the 325 
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consumer and third parties (Figure 5).  It is conceptually presented with more holes, 326 
suggesting that this slice might arguably be the weakest barrier of a system.  However, a 327 
forward-looking water utility can strengthen the protection offered by this slice by engaging 328 
their public health agency in constructive dialogue and informing consumers about their 329 
reasonable expectations for water quality and how they should respond when those 330 
expectations are not being met. 331 
It can be surmised that the systems perspective approach to human error has greater 332 
potential in analysing the safety of a drinking water system than the person approach as the 333 
former considers not only the errors made by individual operators within the system, but 334 
also the role of various latent conditions that reside within the system.  From the above 335 
analysis, monitoring, assuring and improving the safety of drinking water systems requires 336 
various levels of stakeholder participation and responsibilities.  In their analysis of two 337 
water incidents (Case 47 and Case 59 in Table 7), Woo and Vicente (2003a) conclude that 338 
effective risk management should consider various actors at each level including 339 
government, regulators/associations, company, management, staff and work.  These levels 340 
constitute a complex sociotechnical system of risk management (Rasmussen, 1997). 341 
Research on the impact on drinking water safety can also be found in Vicente and 342 
Christoffersen (2006), Hrudey and Hrudey (2003), Woo and Vicente (2003b), and Vicente 343 
and Christoffersen (2006). 344 
The Swiss cheese model can be developed along with a consideration of approaches 345 
used in risk management for dynamic sociotechnical systems.  The Swiss cheese model 346 
does not mention that the number of holes and the locations and sizes of holes in a slice can 347 
dynamically change but this is self evident.  The dynamic forces that lead to accidents have 348 
often been in place for some time, yet the feedback to reveal the safety implications of these 349 
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forces is often largely unavailable to the actors observing these systems (Vicente and 350 
Christoffersen, 2006) 351 
 352 
Figure 5 A Swiss cheese model for drinking water safety. 353 
 354 
4 Concluding remarks 355 
Major accidents are almost always the result of multiple errors, or combinations of 356 
single errors with pre-existing vulnerable conditions (Wagenaar et al., 1990).   Incidents in 357 
the water sector are combinations of many errors.  Not all HRA techniques are suitable for 358 
application in the water utility sector.  However, drinking water incidents can be caused by 359 
a lack of sufficient vigilance regarding warning signals (that might lead to such incidents), 360 
poor system design, poor installation; and poor maintenance.  All of these can be regarded 361 
as involving human error to a certain degree.  Most of the current HRA approaches have 362 
been developed for a single organisation, but safe drinking water is widely understood as a 363 
collective responsibility (IWA, 2004).  Therefore, the Swiss cheese model requires 364 
amendment for the context of drinking water systems.  Here we have offered a proof of 365 
concept for the application of HRA to water quality incidents, have defined the gestation 366 
and lifecycle of drinking water incidents and investigated human errors in each period of 367 
the lifecycle, extending the Swiss cheese model that aptly depicts barriers existing in 368 
drinking water safety.  Through a re-analysis of case studies, we have reconfirmed the long 369 
delay time of drinking water incidents and reported the active role of latent errors, and third 370 
parties.  Critically, we reassert the necessity of proactive, preventative risk management in 371 
identifying and remedying latent conditions.  Pertinent areas for future research include: 372 
• The development of human error databases.  Research into how to collect and 373 
analyse human error data and the application of error management approaches 374 
within water utilities is required. 375 
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• Investigation of the lifecycle of drinking water accidents.  Understanding the 376 
distribution of human errors across the lifecycle of drinking water incidents might 377 
help reduce errors and allow targeted action 378 
• Development of human error management tools.  We suggest error management, 379 
warning handling and error prediction tools are required for the drinking water 380 
sector.  An on-line tool may be useful for this purpose. 381 
• Development of effective warning systems.  For the new slice in Figure 5, 382 
emergency population warning (EPW) systems, for example, have been used for 383 
tornadoes, hurricanes, and ice storms; geological incidents such as earthquakes, 384 
landslides, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis.  It is a method whereby local, 385 
regional, or national authorities can contact members of the public en masse to 386 
warn them of an impending emergency.  Might such a method help contain 387 
drinking water outbreaks? 388 
• Addressing overconfidence arising from the infrequent occurrence of drinking water 389 
outbreaks in developed countries making the maintenance of informed vigilance 390 
a management challenge. 391 
In pursuing this agenda, we now seek to exemplify this proof of concept with the detailed 392 
practical application of HRA concepts to water quality incidents.  In doing so, we seek 393 
build a database of active, latent and third party errors,  model sub-systems and build 394 
incident prediction models. 395 
 396 
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Figure 2 The Swiss cheese model (redrawn from Reason 1990). 
Figure 1: Publication distribution of HRA (adapted from 
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Table 1: Estimating human error probability 531 
Factor Error promoting 
condition 
Proportion assessment 
factor Assessed Effect 
Inexperience 2 0.5 (2-1) × 0.5 + 1 =1.5 
Opposite technique 4 0.8 (4-1) × 0.8 + 1 =3.4 
Risk Misperception 3 0.6 (3-1) × 0.6 + 1 =2.2 
Conflict of Objectives 1.5 0.5 (1.5-1) × 0.5 + 1 =1.25 
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Figure 4 A typical gestation for a drinking water incident. 
24 
Table 2: Human error distribution in the 61 cases. 540 
Error classification Occurrences 
Physical system failures and extreme environmental conditions  (PE) 39 
Active errors (AE) 
 
 
Mistaken belief of the security of a water system 16 
Failed to recognise warnings 11 
Failed to take adequate measures on warnings 19 
Others 20 
Subtotal of the occurrences of active errors 66 
Latent errors (LE) 64 




Table 3. Physical system failures and extreme environmental conditions (PE). 543 
• Equipment failure  
• Disease-carrying animals 
• Animal waste  
• Extreme weather 
 544 
 545 
Table 4. Active errors (AE). 546 
• Failed to appreciate the vulnerability of water systems  
• Failed to recognise warning signals 
• Failed take adequate measures after waning signals were received  
• Sanitary violations 
• Failed to follow recommendation 
 547 
 548 
Table 5. Latent errors (LE). 549 
• Design errors 
o A lack of sufficient water safety barriers 
o Deficiencies existed in system  
o Raw water not being isolated from animal wastes 
• Maintenance errors 
• Operation errors 
• Insufficiently qualified staff 
• Inadequately trained operators 





Table 6. Influences from consumers, third parties (CTE). 553 
• Failure to inform new residents and visitors consuming undisinfected surface water 
• Failure to report warning signals 
• Failure to appreciate of the risk of disease transmission 
• A lack of cooperation or interaction among various parties responsible for water safety 
• Poor communication among various parties 




Table 7. 61 Drinking water incident cases and their corresponding human errors. 556 
No Place, time Possible causes 
1 Richmond Heights, 
Florida, USA., January-
Mar 1974 
• Failure in a physical system (PE)  
• Mistaken belief in the security of the groundwater supply (AE)  
• Poor operating practices (LE)   
• Failed to take adequate action to protect consumers after the fault was recognised 
(AE)  
2 Rome, New York, USA., 
Nov 1974-Jun 1975 
• Failed to recognize that the level of chloramination was too low (AE)  
• A lack of water filtration (LE)  
• Warnings being unheeded (AE)  
3 Crater Lake, Oregon, 
USA., Jun-Jul 1975 
• Extreme weather  caused water contamination (PE)  
4 Camas, Washington, 
USA, Apr-May 1976 
• Errors in design of the water system (LE)  
• Poor operating practice (LE)  
• Infected animal (PE)  
• Physical system failure (PE)  
5 Berlin, New Hampshire, 
USA, Mar-May 1977 
• Physical system failure (PE)  
• Serious deficiencies in the rebuilt filters (LE)  
• Violations of regulations found (AE)  
6 Bennington, Vermont, 
USA, May 1978 
• Inadequate response to the conditions that triggered outbreak warnings (AE)  
7 Bradford, Pennsylvania, 
USA, Jul-Dec 1979 
• Operators failed to appreciate the vulnerability of surface water sources (AE)  
• Regulators failed to appreciate the vulnerability of surface water sources (CTE)  
• Infected animals (PE)  
• Extreme weather  (PE)  
• Failed to equip with sufficient barriers (LE)   
• Inadequate operating practice (LE)  
8 Georgetown, Texas, 
USA, Jun 1980 
• Failed to understand the vulnerability of groundwater (AE)  
• Failed to recognize signals from the first outbreak (AE)  
• Failed to equip the water system (LE)  
• Extreme weather  (PE)  
9 Red Lodge, Montana, 
USA, Jun-Aug 1980 
• Failed to appreciate the vulnerability of the surface water supply (AE)  
• Insufficient water treatment (LE)  
• Failed to effectively respond to warning signals (AE)  
10 Bramham, Yorkshire, 
England, July 1980 
• Staff intentionally kept chlorine levels low (AE)  
• Failed to effectively respond to warning signals (AE)  
• Physical system failure (PE)  
11 Rome, Georgia, USA, 
August 1980 
• Poor isolation of the textile plant distribution system from the drinking water 
system (LE)  
• Failed to protect the water supply system (AE)  
12 Grums and Valberg, 
Varmland, Sweden, Oct 
1980 
• Failed to isolate the water supply system from the river water irrigation systems 
(LE)  
13 Eagle-Vail, Colorado, 
USA, Mar 1981 
• Inadequate operation (LE)  
• Failed to investigate an alarm (AE)  
• Failed to equip with effective barriers (LE)  
14 Mjovik, Blekinge, 
Sweden, Oct 1992 
• Failure of a sewer system (PE)  
• Failed to provide disinfection in the water system (LE)  
• Failed to know the system thoroughly (AE)  
15 Drumheller, Alberta, 
Canada, Feb 1983 
• Failure in a physical system (PE)  
• Extreme weather  (PE)  
• A lack of cooperation or interaction among various parties (CTE)  
• Failed to issue a boil water advisory earlier (AE)  
• Failed to recognise vulnerable situation of sewage pump station (AE)  
• Operating winter treatment without coagulation made system vulnerable (LE)  
26 
16 Greenville, Florida, 
USA, May 1983 
• Bird droppings (PE)  
• Poor design of the treatment system (LE)  
• Unsafe acts by operators (AE) 
• Staffing an unlicensed operator (LE)  
17 Braun Station, Texas, 
USA, May-Jul 1984 
• Failed to monitor raw well water (AE)  
• Flawed design in the system (LE)  
18 Alsvag, Norway, June-
Jul 1984 
• Animal waste (PE)  
• Failed to provide treatment for the surface water supply (LE)  
19 Orangeville, Ontario, 
Canada, Apr 1985 
• A lack of chlorination (LE)  
• Animal waste (PE)  
20 Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts, USA, 
Nov 1985-Jan 1986 
• Malfunction in the chlorination equipment (PE)  
• Failed to provide sufficient barriers or treatment (LE) 
• Failed to respond to warning signals (AE)  
• Failed to recognise that an outbreak was in progress (AE)  
• Poor operating practice (LE)  
21 Penticton, B.C., Canada, 
Jun and Nov 1986 
• Inadequate water treatment (LE)   
• Extreme weather (PE)  
• Animal waste (PE)  
22 Salen, Dalarna, Sweden, 
Dec 1986-Jan 1987 
• Failure in the sewer system (PE)  
• Failed to respond to warning signals (AE)  
• Poor design in backflow prevention (LE)  
23 Carrollton, Georgia, 
USA, Jan 1987 
• Inadequate operation: they did not follow proper filtration protocols (AE)  
• Poor design in the monitoring system (LE)  
24 Sunbury, Diggers Rest 
and Bulla, Victoira, 
Australisa, Oct 1987 
• Incorrect judgement that unprotected surface water can be supplied to consumers 
without any treatment barriers (AE)  
• No effective barriers (LE)  
25 Boden, Sweden, March-
Apr 1988 
• Physical system failure (PE)  
• Extreme weather  (PE)  




• Inadequate construction and repair (LE)  
• Failed to recognize livestock wastes as a major source of human pathogens (AE)  
• Failed to meet regulations (LE)  
27 Skjervoy, Norway, July-
Aug 1988 
• Absence of disinfection (LE)  
• Failed to signal warnings (AE)  
28 Swindon, Oxfordshire 
and Wiltshire, England, 
Dec 1988-Apr 1989 
• Inadequately treating recycling filter backwash water (AE)  
• Poor operating practice (LE)  
29 Oakcreek Canyon, 
Sedona, Arizona, USA, 
Apr 1989 
• Failed to confirm and verify the security (AE)  
• Unforeseen contamination scenario (AE)   
• A lack of any disinfection barrier (LE) 
30 Cabool, Missouri, USA, 
Dec 1989-Jan 1990 
• Risks associated with water main break repair during extreme weather not 
recognized (AE)  
• Poor sewerage systems maintenance exposing water distribution to risk (LE)  
• No treatment barrier in place (LE)  
31 Moama, New South 
Wales, Australia, Dec 
1989-Jan 1990 
• Failed to recognise or understand the risks of drinking non-potable water (AE)  
• Maintenance error: broken sewer system (LE)  
32 Creston/Erickson, 
Canada, Jan-Apr 1990 
• Infected animal (PE)   
34 Naas, Count Kildare, 
Ireland, Oct 1991 
• Failurein the physical system (PE)  
• Consumers failed to report warnings (CTE)  
35 Uggelose, Denmark, Dec 
1991-Jan 1992 
• Extreme weather  (PE)  
• Failure of a physical system (PE)  
• Failed to respond to queries about the potential dangers posed by a connection 
(LE)  
• Failed to signal sufficient warnings despite a risk having been raised (AE)  
27 
36 Jackson County, Oregon, 
USA, Jan-Jun 1992 
• Animal waste (PE)  
• Extreme weather  (PE)  
• Failed to provide sufficient barriers (LE)  
• Poor treatment performance (AE) 
37 Warrington, Cheshire, 
England, Nov 1992-Feb 
1993 
• Extreme weather  (PE)  
• Failed to investigate the warning signals even when abnormal turbidity reading 
presented (AE)  
• Failed to conduct routine monitoring (LE)  
38 Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
USA, Mar–Apr 1993 
• Risks associated with sewage contamination of water intake not recognized (AE)  
• Apparently not aware of Cryptosporidium risk (AE)  
• Failed to maintain optimum filtration performance (LE)  
• Failed to recognize signal from consumer complaints (AE)  
39 Gideon, Missouri, USA, 
Nov–Dec, 1993 
• Poor maintenance of water storage allowed faecal contamination (LE)  
• Animal waste (PE)  
• Extreme weather (PE)  
• Water quality management not based on good knowledge of system (AE)  
• No treatment barrier in place (LE)  
40 Noormarkku, Finland, 
Apr 1994 
• Failed to protect the water supply by disinfection (AE)  
• Failed to recognize the dangers posed by flooding conditions (AE)  
• Failed to take appropriate sanitary measures (AE)  
41 Temagami, Ontario, 
Canada, Feb-May 1994 
• Infected animal (PE)  
• Extreme weather (PE)  
• Poor performance and inadequate design of the water system (LE,AE) 
• Poor operation of the package water-treatment plants (AE)  
42 Victoria, B.C., Canada, 
Oct 1994-May 1995 
• Infected animal (PE)  
• A lack of an effective and robust treatment barrier (LE)  
43 Village in Fife, Scotland, 
Mar 1995 
• Failure of a physical system (PE)  
• Failed to signal warnings promptly (AE)  
44 South Devon, England, 
Aug-Sep 1995 
• Failure of a physical system (PE)  
• Deficiencies in the operation (LE)  
• Failed to pay adequate attention to recommendations (AE)  
45 Klarup, North Jutland, 
Denmark, Dec 1995-Mar 
1996 
• Failed to follow up unusual events (AE)  
• A lack of an adequate treatment system (LE)  
46 Cranbrook, B.C.,Canada, 
May-Jun 1996 
• Animal waste (PE)  
• Raw water not being isolated from livestock (LE)  
47 Ogose Town, Saitama 
Prefecture, Japan, Jun 
1996 
• Failure of a physical system (PE)  
• Failed to recognise a major disease risk (AE)  
48 Stromsund, Jamtland, 
Sweden, Aug-Sep 1996 
• Animal waste (PE)  
• Failed to isolate the water system from animal wastes (LE)  
49 NW London and W 
Hertfordshire, England, 
Feb 1997 
• Extreme weather (PE)  
• Failed to follow the recommendations of the reports on preventing 
Crytosporidium contamination (AE,LE) 
50 Resort Hotel, Bermuda, 
Feb 1998 
• Failure in physical systems (PE)  
• No awareness of the system vulnerability (AE)  
• Sanitary deficiencies in the unchlorinated water system (LE)  
• Poor maintenance of the water system (LE)  
51 Heinavesi, Finland, Mar 
1998 
• Failed to understand the mixing behaviour of sewage effluents (AE)  
• Poor knowledge about water treatment (AE)  
52 Alpine, Wyoming, USA, 
Jun-Jul 1998 
• Failed to protect and treat water systems (LE)  
53 Brushy Creek, 
Williamson County, 
Texas, USA, Jul 1998 
• Wrong assumption on the safety of groundwater (AE)  
54 La Neuveville, Bern 
Canton, Switzerland, 
• Frequent false alarms on failures, but paid attention to(AE)  
• Failure of a physical system (PE)  
28 
Aug 1998 • Consumers failed to report abnormalities (CTE)  
55 Washington County Fair 
New York USA, Sept 
1999 
• Not aware of risk from septic seepage field (AE)  
• Allowed use of unchlorinated water from a shallow well (LE)  
• Failed to consider that extreme drought of previous summer might affect water 
supply safety (AE)  
56 Clitheroe, Lancashire, 
England, Mar 2000 
• Deficiencies in the security being found (LE)  
• Failed to follow up or act on the deficiencies that an effective risk assessment 
should reveal (AE)  
57 Walkerton Ontario 
Canada, May 2000 
• Ignored warnings about vulnerability of shallow well when first installed in 1978 
(AE)  
• Failed to adopt source protection recommendations at installation (LE)  
• Regulator failed to implement policy requiring continuous chlorine residual 
monitors on vulnerable shallow wells (CTE)  
• Operators inadequately trained with no knowledge that contaminated water could 
kill consumers (AE)  
• Failed to recognize that extreme weather could cause water contamination  (AE)   
• Failed to maintain chlorine residuals (LE)  
• Failed to monitor chlorine residuals as required (AE)  
58 Resort, Gulf of Taranto, 
Italy, Jul 2000 
• Resort water supply placed at risk by poor design and unsanitary practices (LE)  
• Consumers failed to be aware of the risk of disease transmission (CTE)  
59 North Battleford, 
Canada, Mar-Apr 2001 
• Failed to fix a long-standing vulnerability of water intake downstream of sewage 
discharge (LE) 
• Failure to recognise risk from Cryptosporidium if fine particle removal not 
optimal (LE) 
• Poorly timed and inadequately performed maintenance on water treatment plant 
(AE) 
• Slow recognition of pattern of illness as an indication of a waterborne outbreak. 
(LE) 
60 Asikkala, Finland, Aug 
2000, Aug 2001 and Oct, 
Nov 2001 
• Failed to provide disinfection for insecure water (LE)  
61 Boarding School, 
Hawke’s Bay, New 
Zealand, May 2001 
• Failed to protect the water source from grazing cattle (LE)  





• Failed to investigate warning alarms and take further action to prevent the system 
from contamination (LE)  
• Failed to provide barriers in place to protect consumers from contaminated water 
(LE)  
• Failed to maintain aged sewers (LE)  
 557 
